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**SEISMIC REPAIR AND RETROFIT PRIORITISATION FRAMEWORK**

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1 The 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence caused significant damage to  
2 the Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) building stock. The extent of  
3 damage, post-earthquake changes to the seismic code, new legislation around  
4 earthquake-prone buildings and ongoing changes to clinical service  
5 requirements created a challenging decision-making environment for capital  
6 works repair and retrofit. In this paper we present a framework designed to  
7 assess the seismic resilience of buildings from a holistic perspective and to  
8 determine appropriate levels of seismic retrofit. The framework design ensures  
9 that decisions are driven by building criticality in the context of a healthcare  
10 system. It helps users to balance life safety risk and the demands of delivering  
11 critical clinical services day to day: resulting in safe facilities that provide  
12 effective health services under a range of future conditions. Pilot application of  
13 the framework enabled the reprioritisation of significant capital toward  
14 buildings that provide the most life safety and health service resilience benefits  
15 in the long term. The process and resulting framework from this project is  
16 applicable to a wider range of building owners navigating seismic retrofit

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17 decision-making and the emerging movement toward functional recovery based  
18 building regulation.

## 19 **INTRODUCTION**

20 Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) provides primary, secondary, and tertiary public  
21 healthcare to over 550,000 residents of the Canterbury region, as well as specialist and  
22 emergency healthcare services that support the whole of the South Island of New Zealand. To  
23 facilitate delivery of their services, CDHB has approximately 130 buildings. The 2010-2011  
24 Canterbury earthquake sequence caused significant damage to CDHB's building stock. The  
25 high peak ground acceleration of 0.547g at the Christchurch Hospital site, combined with the  
26 site's susceptibility to liquefaction, caused structural and non-structural damage to clinical and  
27 non-clinical buildings as well as internal and external infrastructure supporting building  
28 function. Liquefaction caused flooding in several buildings, cutting off tunnels connecting  
29 clinical and non-clinical facilities. Retaining walls separating the Avon river from the hospital  
30 failed and lateral spreading caused severe damage to sewage lines. Although there were no  
31 catastrophic structural failures, severe structural damage forced temporary closures in parts of  
32 Canterbury's largest hospital precinct which houses the only emergency department and  
33 intensive care unit in the region (McIntosh et al, 2012).

34 Immediately after the earthquakes CDHB undertook a programme of emergency works to re-  
35 open essential facilities and remove any immediate risks. Beyond these initial repairs, CDHB  
36 had to manage the remaining building repair and seismic retrofit programme within  
37 significantly constrained financial resources. Repair and retrofit costs were exacerbated by  
38 several post-earthquake changes to New Zealand's Building Act and seismic loadings code.  
39 First, in 2011, the Z factor, was increased from 0.22 to 0.3 in Canterbury. The Z-factor is used  
40 in the calculation of the expected earthquake load on a building. The Z-factor varies based on  
41 the seismic risk in a region. This effectively reduced the seismic rating of buildings in the  
42 region, increasing the degree and cost of post-earthquake repair and strengthening work  
43 (Marquis et al, 2017). Second, in 2016, the Building (Earthquake-prone Buildings)  
44 Amendment Act was enacted, which set in place time frames around remediation of  
45 earthquake-prone buildings. Earthquake-prone buildings are those buildings where the ultimate  
46 capacity of all or part of the building is likely to be exceeded in a moderate earthquake; and the  
47 collapse of the building or part would be likely to cause death or injury or damage to other  
48 property (at any level of earthquake shaking). A moderate earthquake is defined as an

49 earthquake that is the same duration but one third the strength of an earthquake that would be  
50 used to design a new building (Building (Specified Systems, Change the Use, and Earthquake-  
51 prone Buildings) Regulations 2005, as amended by the Amendment Regulation 2017). In  
52 addition to managing these structural performance requirements, CDHB has an ongoing  
53 requirement to comply with a number of healthcare service regulations and meet societal  
54 expectations for service provision.

55 These challenges created a need for a decision-making process that would enable CDHB to  
56 prioritise buildings to repair and guide the extent of retrofit needed. This process had to balance  
57 life safety risks from earthquakes with other pressing healthcare service delivery needs now  
58 and into the future.

59 Current publicised approaches to seismic performance decision making do not provide a  
60 sufficiently nuanced assessment of buildings to ensure that investment or disinvestment  
61 decisions are effectively balancing life safety and service provision. Without a sound approach  
62 to decision-making, significant investment in seismic building upgrades could be made with  
63 limited payback or limited understanding of the value of the investment (Hare, 2019). There is  
64 little literature that currently addresses this challenge, and there are many large public and  
65 private sector organisations with broad property portfolios in seismically active zones that are  
66 facing these decisions. Both the development process and the resulting CDHB decision  
67 framework will be of interest to the growing movement toward functional recovery-based  
68 building codes (FEMA-NIST, 2021; Porter 2021; Tanner et al, 2020) as well as practitioners  
69 facing similar capital works prioritisation projects to improve seismic safety.

70 This paper sets out the decision-making framework that was developed to assist CDHB both  
71 meet legislative requirements and allocate limited financial resources to provide the greatest  
72 resilience and operational benefit to health services while also effectively managing life safety.

## 73 **BACKGROUND**

### 74 **SEISMIC DESIGN – LIFE SAFETY**

75 In New Zealand, buildings are typically designed for life safety (Ultimate Limit State, ULS)  
76 and checked for functional performance (Serviceability Limit States, SLS1 and SLS2). The  
77 seismic strength required for a new building is determined based on its Importance Level (IL)  
78 rating and the design life of the building. Under AS/NZS1170:2002, importance levels are  
79 defined based on a combination of building function and occupancy. Importance Level 4 (IL4)

80 buildings are those that are required post-disaster (such as emergency surgical facilities, fire,  
81 police, and utilities). IL3 buildings are those that house large numbers of people (such as non-  
82 emergency surgical facilities, theatres, outpatients facilities etc). Most buildings are IL2.

83 At ULS a new building is expected to allow for safe evacuation but may no longer be habitable.  
84 Collapse occurs at a higher threshold. ULS for IL2 buildings is based on a 10% probability of  
85 exceedance during the nominal 50 year life of the building (this is equivalent to a 1 in 500-year  
86 return event). For IL3 and IL4 the design probability of exceedance is 5% and 2% respectively  
87 for the same 50 year life.

88 Today, percent of New Building Standard (%NBS) is a commonly used metric to represent the  
89 seismic strength of an existing building: that is, the expected capacity of the building relative  
90 to the seismic demand the Loadings Standard applies to an equivalent new building on the same  
91 site. While %NBS may appear at face value a straightforward concept, the complexities of  
92 seismic events and the nuances of structural design mean that the link between %NBS, building  
93 performance and life safety risk is not always linear. Earthquakes have a range of different  
94 ground-shaking effects and %NBS will not predict how the building will perform in a particular  
95 earthquake (Hare, 2019). Percent NBS does not predict seismic performance from one  
96 earthquake to the next (Hare, 2019).

97 Another factor that contributes to building life safety risk that is not integrated in a sufficiently  
98 nuanced way into current assessments of seismic safety (i.e. %NBS) is occupancy rates. The  
99 Importance Level classifications are based on the function and occupancy level of a building,  
100 but they focus on peak occupancy. The average occupancy of a building, including how many  
101 people use the building and the frequency and duration they occupy it, is not considered.  
102 However, average occupancy is an important measure of the exposure of people to seismic risk  
103 and allows for a more graduated measure and assessment of life safety risk. For example,  
104 buildings more frequently occupied by a greater number of people pose a higher life safety  
105 risk. Having a more nuanced measure of exposure is particularly important where building  
106 owners are having to distribute constrained resources across a portfolio of buildings and  
107 maximise life safety and other benefits.

108 Table 1 describes how life safety risk increases, as %NBS decreases (MBIE, 2017). The ranges  
109 in the table indicate the uncertainties and complexities described above – including the  
110 variability in earthquakes, complexities in the building code, different importance levels of  
111 buildings and the range of occupancy types.

112 **Table 1.** Estimated life safety risk of buildings based on %NBS (MBIE, 2017)

Percentage of New Building Standard (%NBS)	Alpha rating	Approx. risk relative to a new building	Life-safety risk description
>100	A+	Less than or comparable to	Low risk
80-100	A	1-2 times greater	Low risk
67-79	B	2-5 times greater	Low to Medium risk
34-66	C	5-10 times greater	Medium risk
20-33	D	10-25 times greater	High risk
<20	E	25 times greater	Very high risk

113 Accordingly, a %NBS rating does not represent an absolute assessment of risk or safety and a  
 114 rating of less than 34%NBS (the threshold for an earthquake-prone building in the Building  
 115 Act) does not mean that a building poses an imminent life safety risk nor is that building  
 116 expected to collapse in moderate levels of earthquake shaking. The aim of the %NBS metric is  
 117 to provide a relative assessment of structural seismic risk. Qualified engineering advice is  
 118 important to provide a more nuanced assessment of seismic risk, potential collapse mechanisms  
 119 (based on structural system) and other factors such as structural form, building ductility and  
 120 known conservatisms in the building code.

121 **SEISMIC DESIGN - FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE**

122 As well as Ultimate Limit State (ULS), the Loadings Standard NZS1170.0 sets Serviceability  
 123 Limit States (SLS) which define levels at which the building must remain operational. The SLS  
 124 levels are significantly lower than ULS. All structural and non-structural components must be  
 125 undamaged in a 1 in 25 year return period earthquake event (SLS1, for IL2, 3 and 4 buildings).  
 126 IL4 buildings have an additional requirement that the structure maintains operational continuity  
 127 during a 1 in 500 year event (SLS2, for 50-year design life building).

128 There is a movement internationally to create a step-change in seismic performance: moving  
 129 beyond codes based on life safety to a focus on improved functional recovery (FEMA-NIST,  
 130 2021; Porter, 2021; Tanner, et al., 2020). Many authors are also calling for elucidating societal  
 131 expectations of performance into the development of building codes to better reflect societal  
 132 risk tolerance (MBIE, 2020; Tanner, et al., 2020).

133 As CDHB considered their repair and retrofit programme it became clear that existing  
 134 measures, like %NBS, were not suitable to prioritise building upgrades nor to inform the degree  
 135 of seismic retrofit that was optimal. %NBS did not provide a sufficiently nuanced or robust

136 determination of the life safety risk or resilience of buildings to effectively prioritise building  
 137 seismic retrofit works. Moreover, the metric and the SLS levels set in the Loadings Standard  
 138 narrows users’ perspectives to just safety rather than functionality, usability and considerations  
 139 of the building (and functions within that building) in a wider system. CDHB needed a decision  
 140 framework that ensured prioritisation considered the resilience of the health system, not just  
 141 the life safety or functioning of an individual building.

142 **BUILDING PRIORITISATION AND PERFORMANCE RATING SYSTEMS**

143 While seismic strengthening prioritisation systems exist, they often focus purely on structural  
 144 performance (e.g., Sevieri et al., 2020; Grant et al. 2007). Some prioritisation frameworks take  
 145 a multi-capital approach to prioritisation and evaluate benefits of seismic strengthening such  
 146 as economic and socio-cultural benefits (e.g., Aigwi, 2019). Neither approach addresses how  
 147 to prioritise a building as part of a networked building system, in particular a system that  
 148 supports a complex and interconnected service such as a health care service. The authors were  
 149 unable to identify any comprehensive literature on seismic strengthening prioritisation  
 150 frameworks that focus on the resilience and functionality of a networked building system.

151 Seismic performance rating systems perform a similar function as a prioritisation system, in  
 152 that they define criteria that makes a building, or network of buildings, more resilient. This  
 153 provides some parallels to the desired outcomes of the prioritisation framework and criteria to  
 154 assess the gap between current building resilience and desired resilience.

155 Table 2 summarises four health and non-health related building performance rating systems.  
 156 These frameworks, to varying degrees, propose metrics or criteria to assess a building’s  
 157 performance beyond seismic strength.

158 **Table 2.** Health and non-health-related building performance rating systems.

System	Assessment	Key Criteria	Reference
United States Resiliency Council (USRC)	Building system	- Safety (risk to life, risk of injury) - Repair costs - Time to regain basic function	(USRC, 2021)
Resilience-based Earthquake Design Initiative (REDi)	Building System	- Organisation resilience - Building resilience - Loss assessment - Ambient resilience metrics	(Almufti et al., 2013)

World Health Organisation and Pan American Health Organisations' Health Safety Index (HSI)	Health System	- Geographic location - Structural - Non-structural - Emergency and Disaster Management	(WHO, 2015)
Multi-disciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER)	Health System	- Structural - Non-structural - Lifelines - Personnel	(Yavari, et al, 2010)

159 Both USRC and REDi are based on quantitative analysis/modelling of building performance,  
160 applicable to any building use-type. USRC addresses damage at the building level only,  
161 whereas REDi includes an assessment of the resilience of a building owner/occupier and any  
162 anticipated impacts from neighbouring structures. HSI and MCEER are health-specific  
163 performance rating systems that move beyond just structural safety assessments and consider  
164 infrastructure services, emergency planning, staff, and supplies.

165 These systems give good examples of the typical criteria considered in building performance  
166 such as lifelines condition, personnel, downtime assessment, utility disruption, critical building  
167 contents, structural resilience, and non-structural resilience. However, some authors note  
168 limitations to these performance rating systems (Boston and Mitrani-Reiser, 2016). The rating  
169 systems are typically conservative. Impact ratings (particularly for the quantitative methods)  
170 are driven by the maximum damage state, and the systems have limited capacity to capture and  
171 account for emergent human behavior that could mitigate the effect of the disruption. This can  
172 lead to an over-estimation of damage and loss of operability (for example, if the damage only  
173 affects part of a building) (Boston and Mitrani-Reiser, 2016).

174 **METHOD**

175 To inform the development of the CDHB prioritisation framework, interviews were carried out  
176 with 1) CDHB representatives, 2) engineers, and 3) experts involved in capital works  
177 prioritisation projects. These interviews aimed to:

- 178 1. Clarify CDHB's requirements for the revised building investment prioritisation  
179 framework (6 representatives from CDHB)
- 180 2. Identify performance objectives against which an individual or portfolio of buildings  
181 can be assessed (representatives from CDHB and 3 engineers)

182 3. Identify and assess different techniques for prioritisation (3 experts involved in capital  
183 works prioritisation projects)

184 Using this baseline data, and literature review results, a decision support framework was  
185 developed. The framework was tested and refined through two end-user workshops.

186 Workshop One tested the overall framework concept with the CDHB Executive Team ensuring  
187 the prioritisation criteria aligned with the CDHB’s objectives, and that the resultant levels of  
188 risk were acceptable. Workshop Two focused on testing the usability and robustness of the  
189 updated framework, and to sense check results with a range of hospital staff representing  
190 facilities management, clinical/operations, and site redevelopment unit.

191

192

## 193 **INTERVIEW FINDINGS**

### 194 **CDHB Interview Findings**

195 CDHB staff who were interviewed highlighted an opportunity for the framework to clearly and  
196 transparently articulate the trade-offs that CDHB was having to make in its seismic remediation  
197 programme. Interviewees hoped the framework would provide the structure and language to  
198 better demonstrate the risk profile being carried, not just related to seismic risk, but risk to  
199 service delivery and staff comfort also. In particular, interviewees suggested a framework that  
200 looked beyond the blunt engineering seismic rating tool of %NBS to broader resilience and  
201 functional considerations, such as residual building life and usefulness, and opportunities  
202 during a retrofit to contribute to the ‘long-life, loose fit’ goal for CDHB building stock. From  
203 a hospital context ‘long-life, loose fit’ means a building portfolio that not only has longevity,  
204 but also has the ability to be adapted as health service delivery needs change in the future.

205 Interviewees were asked to identify potential criteria they would use to prioritise building  
206 repairs/retrofits, considering both emergency requirements and business-as-usual. Key themes  
207 that emerged as priorities are summarised in Table 3. The top priority for interviewees was  
208 building safety and compliance. However, there was also a strong message that this risk should  
209 be assessed relative to the essential services that CDHB provide, and the framework should  
210 aim to achieve a ‘balance of harm’ between life safety risks from low probability earthquakes  
211 other pressing, day-to-day healthcare service delivery needs now and into the future.

212 **Table 3.** Criteria for prioritisation of seismic retrofit

Safety	Post-disaster functionality	Long term focus	Impacts of seismic retrofit works
Building and infrastructure integrity	Ability to relocate patients from damaged buildings	Alignment with Strategic and Master Plan	Disruption to services
Legislative compliance (acknowledging legislation is dynamic)	Infrastructure needs	Flexibility of building for changing clinical needs (long life loose fit)	Impacts of technology upgrades
Staff perception of safety	Equipment needs to treat patients safely	Operational efficiency (both building and clinical services)	Relocation costs
Patient safety/acuity of service	Role as an emergency service provider for the whole of South Island	Co-location of clinical services	Infection control
Risk to neighbouring buildings/infrastructure		Accessibility	
Balance of harm (seismic and clinical safety)		Management of non-seismic risks (natural and clinical)	

213 **Engineer Interview Findings**

214 A unanimous opinion from all engineers interviewed (as noted above) was that %NBS is a  
 215 crude way of estimating life safety and building performance. It may not align with the general  
 216 performance or the consequences of failure for the operation of the facility (either at building  
 217 level or health system level), and in some cases can be conservative in the assessment of some  
 218 building types. Engineers noted that performance needs to be assessed on a case by case basis  
 219 based on the functional requirements of the building. However, there are certain considerations  
 220 that engineers can make to assess collapse potential or performance relative to calculated  
 221 %NBS. **Collapse potential** can be determined through understanding the structural system  
 222 (e.g. unreinforced masonry vs reinforced concrete). Masonry buildings pose the highest life  
 223 safety risk to those outside the building, whereas concrete structures will cause higher  
 224 casualties because they collapse inward and tend to be bigger and have higher occupancy rates.  
 225 Beyond collapse potential, a qualitative assessment could be carried out based on the level of  
 226 confidence of the %NBS value. This assessment could include factors such as **building**

227 **ductility, known conservatisms in the building code** (e.g. shear capacity of concrete) and  
228 **structural form** (shape, height etc). Currently, there are no established tools to measure these,  
229 so the assessment would rely on judgement from experienced engineers. This judgement should  
230 be based on an assessment of the current state of the building and not on its original design  
231 assumptions.

232 All engineers agreed that, with an experienced engineer, a relative assessment of building  
233 quality (considering not just %NBS) could be done relatively quickly. Modelling against  
234 different earthquake events is possible but is much more time consuming and expensive. The  
235 assessments become more difficult with complex buildings and those that have been  
236 extended/added to over time.

237 Engineers also discussed how as part of the consideration of life safety, a risk lens may be  
238 necessary to weigh the relative safety risks to staff and patients. Current ‘Importance Levels’  
239 defined in AS/NZS1170 Structural Design Actions are based on peak occupancy (and  
240 functionality) but generally do not consider the frequency of occupancy. Staff inevitably will  
241 have greater exposure (compared to patients) to risk from unsafe buildings, but this has to be  
242 weighed against the risk to patients of non-delivery of services.

243 The performance of non-structural elements can be almost as critical as structural performance  
244 when considering post-event functionality. Even if the structure performs well, services can be  
245 disrupted by damage to wall and ceiling linings, building mechanical equipment (e.g. HVAC)  
246 and potentially damaged or inaccessible critical medical equipment and stock. Damage to  
247 critical medical equipment can be highly disruptive, especially if it is difficult to replace.  
248 Service disruption potential is not typically included in a %NBS assessment. Protection of  
249 hazardous material may also be critical. Decisions around repairs may be about balancing the  
250 cost spent on structural vs non-structural repairs/upgrades. For example, it may be more  
251 beneficial for buildings with a temporary life (e.g., 10 years) to focus on having quality non-  
252 structural strengthening to avoid services being disrupted in small to moderate earthquakes.

### 253 **Expert Interview Findings**

254 Three experts were interviewed based on their role in developing and using similar capital  
255 works prioritisation processes in other contexts. Across the interviews, eight key principles  
256 emerged for the successful design and application of a prioritisation framework:

- 257 - Recognise and articulate the decision context - the urgency of decisions, decision  
258 constraints and the presence of divergent views.

- 259 - Create and use a clear and transparent framework but acknowledge the need for
- 260 adaptability (e.g. in the face of resource constraints or external influences).
- 261 - Consider building retrofit as just one part of the risk management process (in conjunction
- 262 with emergency and building continuity plans and procedures and emergency training).
- 263 - Accept that ‘do nothing’ is an option, even if money has been spent on assessments.
- 264 - Bring key stakeholders, including building users, into the decision process.
- 265 - Communicate and be open about the process and create a sense of togetherness.
- 266 - Include individuals with diverse views into the prioritisation process and help them to
- 267 understand and manage the trade-offs being made.
- 268 - With end-users, talk about ‘confidence’ in building strength, rather than ‘safety’.

## 269 **THE PRIORITISATION FRAMEWORK**

270 The prioritisation framework set out to help CDHB decision makers work through the  
271 following three key objectives: 1) to prioritise the CDHB Earthquake Programme of Works; 2)  
272 to determine suitable repair/retrofit levels for buildings; 3) to clearly articulate the trade-offs  
273 CDHB is having to make and the risk profile it is carrying.

### 274 **PRIORITISATION PROCESS**

275 The prioritisation framework is shown in Figure 1. The four main steps in the decision  
276 process are 1) criticality categorisation, 2) assessment of repair and retrofit options based on  
277 the gap between current and desired performance of building, 3) cost assessment, and 4) other  
278 considerations. This process is intended to be an iterative process. While the process is  
279 applied building by building, the framework prompts users to consider the building (and  
280 functions housed in the building) as part of a wider health care system to ensure resources are  
281 allocated effectively across the building portfolio.


#### 282 **Criticality categorisation**

283 A clear outcome from the framework development process was the importance of letting the  
284 building function drive the prioritisation of seismic repair and retrofit. This message was clear  
285 from both an engineer’s point of view and CDHB interviews. As shown in Figure 1, the first  
286 step in the framework aims to categorise the building stock based on their life safety risk and  
287 functional importance, considering both now and future building use in the long term Master  
288 Plan. This step explicitly prompts users to consider the building and services from a network  
289 perspective, bearing in mind the local, regional, and national role of the hospital.

290 The criticality rating (A to D, where A is the most critical) is based on 6 criteria:

- 291 • Building occupancy (number, vulnerability, mobility of users and frequency of use)
- 292 • Importance of continued function post-disaster
- 293 • Risk to neighbouring structures/key access routes/critical infrastructure
- 294 • Ability to relocate services/patients
- 295 • Acuity or sensitivity of service (e.g. NICU, acute theatres, high infection-risk services,  
296 biohazards, high-security risk, forensic mental health, acute dialysis, etc)
- 297 • Health system failure potential

298 This step provides a relative measure that can be used to express the risks that remain if there  
299 is insufficient budget to retrofit all buildings to a standard suited to their criticality level.



300

301 **Figure 1.** CDHB Prioritisation Framework Diagram (note that this is an overview, tables and notes to  
 302 support decision framework are not included for brevity)

303

304 **Assessment of Repair and Retrofit Options**

305 For each criticality category, the framework defines a set of performance objectives. Given the  
306 challenges identified in both the engineer and CDHB interviewees, the framework set out to  
307 provide more clarity and nuance around structural performance than those set out in the  
308 building code and loadings standard.

309 The performance objectives include life safety (the ultimate limit state (ULS)) as %NBS,  
310 operational continuity (the serviceability limit state (SLS2)), expected performance during a  
311 significant event, and building-specific performance criteria.

312 Due to the importance of operational continuity for healthcare, the emphasis of the building  
313 performance requirements is on 'operational' performance. The life safety performance  
314 objectives in the framework meet minimum Building Code requirements. The operational  
315 continuity expectations are necessarily set at a higher level than required in the Building Code  
316 (this includes creating SLS2 performance criteria for IL2 and IL3 buildings, as there are  
317 currently no such provisions in the Building Code). The intent is to focus resources on reducing  
318 disruption to operations during smaller earthquake events, rather than improving life safety in  
319 more significant events. For example, the operational continuity expectation for criticality A  
320 buildings are set at a 10% chance of exceedance during the 50-year design life of the building.  
321 This is equivalent to designing for a 1 in 500 year event and is current SLS2 performance  
322 criteria for IL4 hospital buildings. The operational continuity expectation for category B and  
323 C buildings are set relative to this: 18% for criticality B buildings (1 in 250 year event) and  
324 40% for criticality C (1 in 100 year event) (none specified for criticality D).

325 The framework also provides some qualitative statements of expected performance under a  
326 given earthquake. Under the NZ Loadings Standard, the ULS design earthquake is different for  
327 buildings of different Importance Levels. This makes it difficult for owners of a portfolio of  
328 buildings to understand how their entire building stock might perform in a given event and  
329 therefore understand the impact it would have on their ability to deliver services. The expected  
330 performance criteria are intended to create a common understanding between CDHB staff and  
331 engineers on the relative performance of buildings of each criticality category. For this  
332 framework, expected performance statements are created for an earthquake with a 10% chance  
333 of exceedance during the life of the building. The statements describe usability immediately  
334 following the event, usability in the short to medium term, and a damage description. Table 4  
335 gives an example of the description for a Category A building.

336 **Table 4.** Category A performance expectation criteria

	Performance expectation
Usability Immediately Post Earthquake	Parts/components required to maintain those operations for which the building is designated critical are required to be returned to a fully operational state within an acceptably short time frame (minutes or hours).
Usability Short to Medium Term post- Earthquake	Repair will cause little or no disruption to services
Damage	Damage requiring cosmetic repairs of a minor and non-urgent nature is acceptable in localised areas. Repair can be carried out with minimal disruption to a functioning department.

337 The framework also provides a set of questions that need to be discussed between CDHB and  
 338 engineers, so that engineers fully understand the performance needs of the hospital. For  
 339 example, these needs could be related to patient evacuation, infection control, protection of  
 340 specialistic equipment, and security requirements.

341 Using the criticality categories assigned to buildings, and the above performance criteria,  
 342 engineers evaluate the gap between the current state of the building, the expected life of the  
 343 building, and the desired performance objectives. Note that the assessment is based on the  
 344 desired performance given the current use of the building and not the original design  
 345 parameters for the building. Based on that, CDHB staff and engineers will undergo an iterative  
 346 process evaluating repair and replacement options. Factors considered in this stage include:  
 347 the current performance of buildings, the necessary degree of repair and strengthening given  
 348 the criticality category, and desired performance objectives. Replacement options would also  
 349 be considered at this stage, if applicable. During this stage, some buildings may drop out of the  
 350 process if they already meet the performance standards for their criticality rating.

351 **Cost Assessment**

352 The next step is to evaluate the relative costs of one or more options. The cost assessment  
 353 criteria asks users to evaluate 1) the repair and retrofit options relative to the cost of replacement  
 354 and 2) cost of disruption to services during repairs from a repair or replacement option. Users  
 355 then make qualitative adjustments for savings or benefits related to 1) reduced maintenance,  
 356 operations and non-structural capital upgrades; and 2) service efficiency benefits. This cost  
 357 assessment is designed to ensure options fully consider the direct and indirect, capital and

358 operational, short and long term impacts. Each building will be assigned a High, Medium, Low  
359 rating based on the relative costs and benefits. Users are then prompted to consider ways to  
360 enhance the outcome and/or efficiency of the selected option through a Change of Service in  
361 the building, other Opportunity to enhance the building/service delivery, potential to Do  
362 nothing or Replace the building.

### 363 **Other Considerations**

#### 364 *Change Service*

365 If a repair or replacement option has a high cost, one option is to change the use of the building.  
366 By changing the function of the building and/or relocating some or all the services within the  
367 building the criticality category can be reduced and therefore so are the building repair/retrofit  
368 requirements. Evaluating this would require a discrete piece of work and would need to be  
369 carried out in consultation with the master/strategic plan from a health service delivery  
370 perspective.

#### 371 *Opportunity*

372 If a retrofit option requires major physical works there is an opportunity to add value, efficiency  
373 or resilience at marginal cost. Opportunities include the potential to: reduce risks from other  
374 hazards (fire, flood, pandemic, infection, asbestos); improve operational efficiency (e.g. co-  
375 location of services to improve staff and patient flows); reduce operational costs (heating,  
376 maintenance etc); upgrade to meet current standards/best-practice; provide a new service;  
377 offset future expenditure; improve staff wellbeing; repurpose to house another service; consider  
378 the use of a building to act as a decanting space during repairs; or as a flexible space that could  
379 be used in an emergency response.

#### 380 *Do Nothing*

381 Before a decision to do something is made, the option to 'do nothing' should be considered. In  
382 some cases, the cost of repair may not be worth the improved performance outcomes. However,  
383 a 'do nothing' option should consider issues such as availability or cost of insurance, lost  
384 opportunity for efficiency gains through the repair process, and regulatory penalties that may  
385 be incurred due to non-compliance with legislative requirements. Buildings where 'do nothing'  
386 is the final outcome will often still need non-structural repairs (e.g. plasterboard cracks) but  
387 this can be done as part of on-going maintenance and capital upgrade work programmes.

#### 388 *Replacement*

389 For options where the repair option is high relative to building replacement, or there is potential  
390 to reduce significant ongoing operational and maintenance costs of a building, then  
391 replacement should be considered. An option to replace a building should fully evaluate the  
392 time and cost to plan and build a new building and the ability to relocate services during the  
393 rebuild (if the rebuild is at the same location as the damaged building).

#### 394 **Decision Sense Check**

395 When the framework leads to an abandon, repair or replace decision, it is then subject to a  
396 subjective discussion: “Is this the right thing to do now?”. This point is where a reality check  
397 on decisions is made considering the context and timing of the decision from a health care  
398 system perspective. It is also used as an opportunity to consider any external risks that the  
399 building/service faces (e.g. potential to be in a cordon or to have damage from a neighbouring  
400 building etc), or if there are other ways to mitigate the risk to the people/services (e.g. by  
401 relocation of the services or by rearranging the services within a building).

402 At this stage legal checks are also undertaken to ensure compliance with the Building Act,  
403 Health and Safety at Work Act, Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act and Health  
404 and Disabilities Act. The potential disruption due to repairs and the ability to decant or move  
405 services to allow for repairs is also considered. However, this is in many cases a scheduling  
406 issue and is part of the implementation stage.

#### 407 **Final Prioritisation**

408 Once the above is completed and the scope of works has been defined for each building, the  
409 general priority order of all buildings in the CDHB portfolio designated as ‘repair’ or ‘replace’  
410 needs to be determined. This is to help prioritise the order of capital works and ensure that  
411 limited financial resources are directed towards the most critical buildings: as driven by the  
412 needs of the health system (both day to day needs and post-earthquake needs). The framework  
413 suggests prioritising building retrofits first by direct risk to life safety (e.g. building collapse,  
414 fire risk, and patient safety); second, meeting legislative requirements; third, criticality (as  
415 defined in this framework); fourth, where there is opportunity for efficiency improvements;  
416 fifth, where buildings provide flexibility of space (long life, loose fit); and last, where staff  
417 wellbeing will be improved.

#### 418 **FRAMEWORK EFFICACY**

419 The framework is designed to be run as a collaborative process. Participants in the pilot  
420 workshops noted how the framework p evoked quality, deep thinking about each building and

421 helped users to consider buildings in the context of the entire health system. The collaborative  
422 process allowed a range of CDHB staff to connect their different perspectives and contribute  
423 to a joint decision.

424 Engineers contracted by the CDHB noted how effective the framework was for creating a  
425 conversation between engineers and healthcare workers. The process and conversation prompts  
426 helped engineers develop a better picture of how a building should perform. For example, to  
427 enable safe evacuation of spinal patients, it is important to have floors that do not crack and  
428 displace creating obstacles to roller beds.

429 During the pilot workshops, the framework was applied to two hospital campuses in  
430 Canterbury. The original programme of works (prior to framework development) was based  
431 on a goal of achieving 67-100%NBS across all buildings regardless of the buildings role or  
432 importance in the health service delivery system. Application of the framework enabled  
433 approximately 75% of the original capital budget for the pilot campuses to be reprioritised for  
434 use on buildings that provided the most life safety and service resilience benefits in the long  
435 term. Retrofit recommendations resulting from the framework focused on achieving greater  
436 operational performance (SLS2) for smaller earthquake events, while reducing focus on life  
437 safety (ULS) in extreme events. The framework, therefore, achieved the desired ‘balance of  
438 harm’ between life safety in extreme events and the quality and continuity of clinical services  
439 during smaller earthquake events and in the face of a range of other risks. The framework has  
440 been adopted and is being rolled out for CDHB’s earthquake affected building stock.

441 **SUMMARY**

442 The aim of the prioritisation framework was to help the CDHB look at their seismic retrofit  
443 programme with a resilience lens: to look beyond the minimum requirements set in the  
444 Building Code for individual building performance and to critically evaluate what performance  
445 they desired to support the efficient and continued functioning of the health system.

446 The framework provides a structured process to ensure that limited financial resources are  
447 allocated prudently. Following a major and catastrophic event, such as the Canterbury  
448 earthquakes, there can be a tendency to be risk averse and a desire to restore staff/public  
449 confidence by improving the seismic performance of all buildings. But there are practical and  
450 financial limits to this. In a healthcare context, it is important that resources are used to balance  
451 harm between disruption to healthcare services and life safety risk during a significant but low  
452 probability earthquake. It is also essential to consider all risks, not just seismic risk.

453 The criticality categorisation in the framework helps CDHB define how important each  
454 building is in the context of life safety and healthcare continuity from a network perspective.  
455 This criticality rating then informs the appropriate level of seismic strengthening.  
456 Considerations of cost and opportunity help users to think beyond the instinctive response to  
457 restore what was broken to its original form and function and to look for opportunities to  
458 improve service efficiency or even change the use of a building.

459 Both the development process and the resulting framework will be of interest to the growing  
460 movement toward functional recovery based building codes as well as practitioners facing  
461 similar capital works prioritisation projects to improve seismic safety. There is an opportunity  
462 to take some of the ideas in this paper and consider how they may be integrated into building  
463 codes, regulations and standards to enable engineers to take a more risk and resilience based  
464 approach to building design. This includes developing a deeper understanding of how a  
465 building will be used during and after an earthquake, extending seismic assessment beyond  
466 structural performance to functional or operational performance and moving from building by  
467 building perspectives to a network perspective of risk.

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